T he process of introducing new and phasing out old products is called product rollover. This paper considers a periodic-review inventory system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer introduces new and improved products over an infinite planning horizon using the solo-roll strategy. We consider two scenarios: (1) the manufacturer does not share the upstream information about new-product introduction with the retailer and (2) the manufacturer shares the information. For each scenario, we first derive the decentralized ordering policy and the system-optimal ordering policy with given cost parameters. We then devise an optimal supply chain contract that coordinates the inventory system. We demonstrate that when the inventory system is coordinated, information sharing improves the performance of both supply chain entities. However, this may not be true if the inventory system is not coordinated. We also show that under the optimal contract, the manufacturer has no incentive to mislead the retailer about new-product information in the informationsharing model. When demand variability increases, information sharing adds more benefits to the coordinated supply chain. Our research provides insights about coordinating product, financial, and information flows in supply chains with product rollover.
Introduction
The process of introducing new and phasing out old products is called product rollover. To retain existing customers and attract new ones, manufacturers know that they must offer a constant stream of new and improved products over time, which requires successful product rollovers. Because of the dynamic product state and time-to-market pressures, ineffective coordination during product rollover often leads to significant losses (for examples of unsuccessful product rollover, refer to Billington et al. 1998) .
Information sharing has been viewed as a major strategy to achieve supply chain coordination and to mitigate problems in product rollovers. To date, however, research has focused on the downstream or the demand-side information (e.g., the sales information or inventory status at point of sales), which only represents a small part of the total information flow in a supply chain. The upstream or supply-side information, such as lead time, new-product introduction, plant operations, and so forth, is also important for supply chain management. Compared with the downstream information, the upstream information has received less attention (Chen 2003) .
In the past few years, Gillette successfully finished one-day rollouts for the Mach3 and Fusion razors in CVS, the largest pharmacy chain in the United States (O'Neill 2006) . Without sharing critical information with CVS, it would have been impossible for Gillette to smoothly execute the product rollover in just 24 hours. In contrast, Sichuan Changhong Electric (hereafter, Changhong), once the largest television manufacturer in China, adopted a "secret rollout" strategy in 1997. In fewer than 12 months, Changhong consecutively launched new models and cut prices of old models without notifying its retail partners. Such a strategy was intended to surprise consumers and competitors, but it backfired a year later. Many retailers refused to carry Changhong's products or reduced their order sizes after suffering a serious loss due to product obsolescence. Eventually, Changhong's market share tumbled and never recovered (Foo 1998) . These examples accentuate the importance of sharing critical upstream information with supply chain partners during product rollover.
We are not aware of any published operations management (OM) research that simultaneously deals with product rollovers and upstream information about new-product introductions. In this paper, we analyze the effects of sharing the upstream information about new-product introduction on product rollover. Specifically, we consider a periodic-review inventory system that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. The time between two consecutive newproduct introductions is called a cycle. The distribution of the cycle length is random. As soon as a new product is introduced, the old product becomes obsolete and is returned to the manufacturer at the buyback price. The cost parameters, such as retail and wholesale prices, and the customer demand distributions are age dependent. We consider lost sales and linear holding cost at the retailer. Based on the available information, the retailer determines the optimal inventory policy to maximize the expected profit. On the other hand, the make-to-order manufacturer fills the retailer order with negligible lead time. The retailer's operational cost, such as that for capacity adjustment, is assumed to be immaterial compared with the wholesale revenue.
The strategic questions related to sharing upstream information about new-product introduction are the following: What supply chain contract can lead to supply chain coordination (i.e., the decentralized decision is the same as the system's optimal solution)? What is the impact of sharing upstream information on supply chain performance? Will all channel partners benefit from sharing upstream information?
To answer these questions, we first characterize the decentralized and centralized optimal policies under two scenarios: (1) with no information sharing and (2) with information sharing. We then derive an optimal supply chain contract that coordinates the supply chain. We show that if the supply chain is coordinated, information sharing improves the performance of both supply chain entities. But if the supply chain is not coordinated, this may not be true. Additionally, under the optimal supply chain contract, the manufacturer would have no incentive to mislead the retailer about new-product introduction. A numerical study indicates that when demand variability increases, information sharing saves more costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the inventory system. Section 4 analyzes the baseline model without information sharing. Section 5 analyzes the information-sharing model. Section 6 provides numerical examples. Section 7 discusses several of our assumptions. Section 8 concludes. The proof and derivation of important expressions are relegated to the Online Supplement, available at http://www. poms.org/journal/supplements.
Literature Review
Our research overlaps several streams in the literature: information sharing, product obsolescence, supply chain contracting, and new-product preannouncement models. We provide a brief review of the literature in each area.
Because our model is about sharing upstream information, we narrow the scope of our literature review accordingly. For a comprehensive survey on general information sharing, readers are referred to Chen (2003) . The existing models about upstream information deal with such information as lead time and supply availability. Chen and Yu (2005) quantify the value of lead-time information in a single-location inventory system in which the single supplier knows exactly the lead time for every replenishment order. When no information is being shared, the retailer has to rely on the history of order arrivals to infer the current lead time and make replenishment decisions accordingly. A numerical study shows that the cost savings from sharing lead-time information can be significant. Jain and Moinzadeh (2005) study a onemanufacturer, one-retailer inventory system in which the retailer is allowed to access the inventory information of the manufacturer. They show that the retailer's inventory policy changes from a single-level basestock policy to a two-level, state-dependent base-stock policy. Ferguson and Ketzenberg (2006) analyze an inventory system where the supplier is endowed with private information about the expiration date of the available products. They conduct a simulation study using a heuristic solution to compare the performance of the retailer and supplier with and without information sharing. Some of their numerical examples suggest that information sharing does not always benefit the supplier.
Supply chain contracting is a fast-growing research area (for a comprehensive literature review, refer to Cachon 2003 , Kouvelis et al. 2006 . The research in this stream deals with a variety of supply chain contracts such as buyback (e.g., Pasternack 1985) , option contracts (e.g., Wu and Kleindofer 2005) , price protection (e.g., Taylor 2001), and revenue sharing (e.g., Iyer and Bergen 1997, Gan et al. 2005) . The majority of the existing articles in this area are single-period models, whereas our inventory system is a multiperiod model and focuses on the effect of sharing the upstream information. Recently, a new research stream that uses laboratory experiments to examine the analytical results in supply chain contracting has received increased attention (refer to Katok and Wu 2006 for details).
Our work is also related to the product obsolescence model. For a more comprehensive literature review on this topic, refer to survey papers by Nahmias (1982) and Raafat (1991) . Obsolescence models consider obsolescence at either the supply or the demand side. When obsolescence occurs at the supply side (for example, blood products and perishable foods are discarded after their lifetimes), it effectively reduces the inventory on hand (e.g., Nandsakumar and Morton 1993) . When obsolescence occurs at the demand side, demand for the product diminishes over its lifetime (e.g., Song and Zipkin 1993) . There are a few articles dealing with the optimal timing of new-product upgrade with inventory costs (e.g., Wilhelm and Xu 2002 , Wilhelm et al. 2003 , Souza et al. 2004 , Xu and Li 2007 . The existing articles in this area of study focus on the optimal or near-optimal policy for the manufacturer. The coordination issues between the retailer and supplier are ignored. However, the focus of this paper is on comparing the performance of the retailer and manufacturer with and without information sharing.
New-product preannouncement is common practice for manufacturers communicating with supply chain partners and customers about new-product introduction (Lilly and Walters 1997) . The existing marketing research on new-product preannouncements has documented the spread in their timing, contents, and motivation (for a comprehensive review, refer to Kohli 1999) . The focus of the research in this stream is on consumer-related factors (switching costs and learning requirements), industry-related factors (competitor's reactions), and product-related factors (product complexity and feature sets). However, the operational impact of preannouncements on the manufacturer and retailer has not been thoroughly analyzed.
Model Description
We consider an inventory model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Both review inventory periodically, and the length of each review period is equal. For example, each review period represents a quarter. The manufacturer introduces new and improved products over the infinite planning horizon. The period when the manufacturer introduces a new product is called the introduction period. The time between two consecutive introduction periods is called a cycle. We define the age of the product as the number of periods that the current cycle has continued since the last introduction.
There are two common strategies for product rollover: the solo-roll and the dual-roll (Billington et al. 1998) . In a solo-roll, the company sells out or discontinues the old product before introducing the new one; in a dual-roll, the company sells the old and new products simultaneously. We assume that the supply chain adopts the solo-roll strategy. As such, whenever a new product is launched (i.e., a new cycle starts), the old-generation product will be phased out immediately.
At the beginning of each cycle, along with phasing in the new and phasing out the old product, the manufacturer preannounces the development of the next-generation product. However, due to the uncertainty in research and development (R&D), the manufacturer is able to foresee the completion of the next-generation product only one period in advance. We assume that the manufacturer introduces the newest-generation product as soon as R&D is completed. In the baseline model, the manufacturer keeps the information about R&D progress private; in the information-sharing model, the manufacturer shares such upstream information with the retailer. An alternative interpretation is that in the baseline model the manufacturer does not have information about R&D progress, whereas in the information-sharing model she has.
In the baseline model, the system operates as follows. At the beginning of each period, the retailer observes the age of the product and the initial inventory x, with the objective of determining an inventory level y >x to maximize expected discounted total profit. Because the retailer does not know whether the manufacturer will introduce a new product in the next period, she has to rely on the age of the current cycle to infer the manufacturer's R&D progress. Formally, the retailer's belief about the chance that the manufacturer introduces the next-generation product in the following period is
where q i is known as the failure rate of , the random lifetime of the product. The lead time for the manufacturer to fill a retail order is negligible. Leftover inventory at the retailer incurs a linear holding cost, and unmet demand is lost (e.g., customers who plan to buy trendy products are impatient). Customer demand depends on the age of the product and rises periodically. Since the manufacturer preannounces the next-generation product at the beginning of each cycle, customers may prepare for switching and adjust their buying decisions as time elapses. This naturally leads to nonstationary customer demand. Let D i represent the random demand when the age of the current product is i. We denote the cumulative distribution function and density function of D i by F i · and f i · > 0. Cost parameters are also age dependent. When the age of the current product is i, the retail price is r i , the manufacturer's salvage value is b i , and the retailer's holding cost is h i . Note that b i is not the buyback price paid to the retailer but the value recovered by the manufacturer from recycling the obsolete product. We impose the following assumption on the cost parameters.
Assumption 1. (i) The retail price is nonincreasing in age and is not less than the manufacturer's production cost. (ii) The one-period holding cost is positive. (iii) The wholesale price is nonincreasing in age.
The first two points of Assumption 1 are common in practice. Later when we derive the optimal supply chain contract, we shall see that the wholesale price is indeed nonincreasing in age.
In the information-sharing model, the retailer receives the upstream information from the manufacturer and adjusts her inventory decision accordingly. We let j = 0 if the following period is not an introduction period and j = 1 otherwise. We assume that the manufacturer operates a make-to-order system. The production cost of the current product is c (the assumption of age-independent production cost is for expositional simplicity). After receiving the retailer's order, the manufacturer fills the order in a negligible lead time (i.e., the lead time is very short as compared with the length of the period).
To reflect the bargaining power when negotiating a supply chain contract, we introduce a parameter , which is exogenously given and between zero and one. The manufacturer and retailer mutually agree that the retailer retains × 100% and the supplier retains 1 − × 100% of the supply chain profit, which is the sum of the manufacturer's and retailer's profit. We call the profit sharing ratio. We say that the supply chain is coordinated if the retailer's decentralized optimal solution also optimizes the supply chain.
Although there could be other supply chain contracts that are able to induce a coordinated supply chain, hereafter we consider the following supply chain contract. Definition 1. A supply chain contract consists of the wholesale price for the nonobsolete product w i , buyback price for the obsolete product s i , and price protection rate p i .
The supply chain contract defined in Definition 1 operates as follows. When the age of the current nonobsolete product is i, the manufacturer charges a wholesale price w i per unit. If the current period is an introduction period, the obsolete product with age i will be returned to the manufacturer for s i per unit. The manufacturer compensates the retailer for each unit of unsold nonobsolete inventory at rate p i .
The reasons to consider the above supply chain contract are the following. First, the tendency of manufacturers to reduce wholesale prices frequently makes retailers cautious about order quantities. If retailers reduce their order quantities below the supply chain optimal amount (e.g., the Changhong case), it is beneficial to provide them an incentive, such as price protection, to increase their order quantities. Second, buyback alone is not sufficient to achieve supply chain coordination in the multiperiod model. In the singleperiod model, inventory buyback always occurs at the end of the period; hence, buyback is sufficient. But in the multiperiod model, inventory buyback only occurs in the introduction period. During the nonintroduction periods, the retailer is the one who incurs the holding cost and suffers value depreciation due to the decrease in wholesale price. As such, buyback alone is insufficient to achieve supply chain coordination. Third, price protection has been successfully implemented in practice. For example, Intel always hires external auditors to physically inspect the unsold microprocessors held by its distributors whenever Intel is about to announce a major price cut. Based on the auditor's report, Intel compensates the distributors accordingly.
In the next section, we shall derive the expressions of w i , s i , and p i such that the supply chain is coordinated.
Baseline Model

Retailer's Ordering Policy
We derive the retailer's optimal policy when the cost parameters are given (i.e., w i , s i , and p i are given). The task of inventory management for the retailer is complicated in that the cost parameters fluctuate over time and the demand may disappear sometime in the future. Let 0 < < 1 be the discount factor. The dynamic programming problem for the retailer with age i ≥ 0 and initial inventory x ≥ 0 is the following:
where
is the myopic profit function when the age of the product is i and the inventory level is adjusted to y. The procedure for deriving the above expressions is presented in Appendix A of the Online Supplement. In (3), the term
can be understood as the overage cost, which consists of the one-period holding cost h i and the expected value depreciation w i − q i s i+1 − 1 − q i w i+1 + p i+1 . It is clear that g R i y is the newsvendor profit function with profit margin r i − w i and overage cost o i .
The following lemma characterizes the optimal inventory policy for the retailer in the baseline model with given cost parameters. 
Chain-Optimal Ordering Policy
We now turn our attention to the optimal policy that maximizes the supply chain profit (i.e., the sum of the manufacturer's and retailer's profit). We treat the manufacturer and retailer as a single entity and assume that the manufacturer does not have information about R&D progress beforehand. Because the manufacturer's wholesale revenue is the retailer's procurement cost and the manufacturer's price protection payment is the retailer's income, these related-party transactions cancel out when computing supply chain profit. We see that for the supply chain, the production cost is c, selling price is r i , holding cost is h i , and expected salvage value is k i = q i b i+1 + 1 − q i c. As such, the optimality equation for the supply chain is
is the myopic supply chain profit function when the age of the product is i and the inventory level is adjusted to y. We see that g i y is the newsvendor profit function with profit margin r i − c and overage cost h i + c − k i .
Lemma 2. An age-dependent base-stock policy is optimal for (5).
That is, for any given age i, there exists a unique and finite number y * i such that the optimal order quantity is
The proof of Lemma 2 is analogous to that of Lemma 1 and is omitted. As soon as we establish the concavity of g i y in y, the rest of the proof is routine.
How to Induce a Coordinated Supply Chain
Now consider how to find the optimal supply chain contract with wholesale prices w * i , buyback prices s * i , and price protection rate p * i such that the supply chain is coordinated (i.e., y * i = z * i ) and the supply chain profit is split between the manufacturer and retailer according to the profit sharing ratio . The following lemma provides a useful intermediate result.
Lemma 3. For any given age i, if the following condition is satisfied:
then g R i y = · g i y for any given i and y.
Condition (7) means that when the supply chain profit margin and overage cost are proportionally allocated to retailer and manufacturer, the retailer's myopic function equals the supply chain myopic function multiplied by a scalar . If the manufacturer does not provide price protection, then condition (7) may be infeasible. For example, consider that for some i, the failure rate is 0 and there is no price protection (e.g., p i = 0). From (4), we see that o i = h i + w i − q i s i+1 − 1 − q i w i+1 . Because is given, the wholesale prices satisfying condition (7) may not exist in this case.
Condition (7) translates into a supply chain contract with wholesale price
buyback price
and price protection rate
If i = 0 (the current product is just launched), then s * 0 = p * i = 0. It is easy to see that if the retail price is decreasing in age, then w * i is indeed also decreasing in age. If we consider the time-average criterion (e.g., = 1), the price protection rate is
which consists of two parts: w * i−1 − w * i , the reduction in wholesale price, and 1 − h i−1 , a subsidy to the retailer for holding cost. Proposition 1 establishes a contract that maximizes the supply chain profit with decentralized decision making and splits the supply chain profit between retailer and manufacturer according to a predetermined ratio. A noticeable advantage of the optimal contract devised in Proposition 1 is its simplicity and ease of implementation.
In fact, an age-independent profit sharing ratio is important for inducing a coordinated supply chain. Corollary 1. To induce a coordinated supply chain, the profit sharing ratio must be age independent.
Information-Sharing Model
In contrast to her position in the baseline model, the manufacturer in the information-sharing model is endowed with private new-product information, and such upstream information is shared with the retailer. We use superscript s to indicate the informationsharing model. We first derive the retailer's optimal policy with given cost parameters.
Retailer's Ordering Policy
The retailer's state can be represented by i x j . Although there is a new state variable j, it is not necessary to have wholesale prices, buyback prices, and price protection rates be dependent on j. As such, for j = 1 (the following period is an introduction period), the retailer's optimization problem is
Because the following period is an introduction period, the age of the new product and the initial inventory will be reset to zero. With probability q 0 , the system enters state R s 0 0 1 ; with probability 1 − q 0 , it enters state R s 0 0 0 in the following period. For j = 0 (the following period is not an introduction period), the retailer's optimization problem is
Because the following period is not an introduction period, the age of the product will become i + 1. With probability q i+1 , the manufacturer observes j = 1 in the following period and the system enters state i + 1 y − D i + 1 ; with probability 1 − q i+1 , the manufacturer observes j = 0 and the system enters state 
Chain-Optimal Ordering Policy
We now turn our attention to a system-optimal policy that maximizes the supply chain profit. The supply chain's state can be represented by i x j . For j = 1, it can be verified that the optimality equation for the supply chain is
For j = 0, the optimality equation for the supply chain is
Again, a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal because the supply chain myopic function g s i y j is concave in y. 
How to Induce a Coordinated Supply Chain
If the wholesale price, buyback price, and price protection rate satisfy (8), (9), and (10), respectively, one can verify that The proof of Proposition 2 is analogous to that of Proposition 1 and is omitted.
The Effect of Information Sharing
Let ET and ET s be the time-average profit of the supply chain for the baseline and information-sharing model, respectively. 
The closed forms of ET and ET
s , however, are intractable. The improvement in the supply chain profit due to information sharing depends not only on the value of y s i0 , y s i1 , and y * i but also on the differences among them. In the next section, we perform numerical experiments to investigate how various factors could affect the value of information sharing.
The following corollary deals with the truthrevealing issue in the information-sharing model. (8), (9), and (10), the manufacturer has no incentive to provide misleading information to the retailer.
Corollary 2. Under the supply chain contract characterized in
Numerical Examples
The purpose of our numerical study is to investigate how various factors affect the value of information sharing as well as how information sharing affects optimal policies and system performance. For ease of presentation, we first carry out sensitivity analysis with age-independent data. Such a scenario is "memoryless," in essence, with constant failure rate and cost parameters. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to capture many useful insights. Second, we examine the impact of information sharing in a more realistic setting with increasing failure rate and decreasing demand stream. Finally, we compare the performance of the coordinated chain to that of the uncoordinated chain.
Example with Age-Independent Data
By age-independent data, we mean r i = r, h i = h, b i = b, q i = q, and f i x = f x for all i. Because the data are age independent, we can drop the subscript. The related optimality equations are derived in Appendix B of the Online Supplement. We shall consider time-average profit (e.g., = 1). As a special case of (8), (9), and (10), the parameters for the optimal supply chain contract are the following. The wholesale price is w * = 1 − r + c, the buyback price is s * = 1 − r + h + b, and the price protection rate is
as the percent increase of the supply chain profit due to information sharing. We set = 0 5 for convenience. Demand is assumed to be normal with mean 15 and the coefficient of variation (c.v.) is in 0 20 0 33 . The choice of coefficient of variation will ensure that the probability of negative demand is negligible. In our computation, we approximate the continuous normal demand as a discrete random variable with 30 possible demand outcomes and use policy iteration to compute the time average profit. Unless otherwise noted, the manufacturer's production cost is c = 20, sales price is r = 40, recovered value is b = 0, and the retailer's holding cost is h = 1. Figure 1 shows that the supply chain profit increases after information sharing. The percent increase in the supply chain profit is roughly a concave function of the probability of new-product introduction. (That is, when the probability of newproduct introduction is close to either zero or one, the variance of a Bernoulli random variable reduces; thus, the value of information sharing reduces.) Additionally, Figure 1 also shows that ET is larger if the demand variability is larger, given all else unchanged. However, when the demand variability increases, the supply chain profit decreases.
If the supply chain is not coordinated, then an individual party's profit may not increase. For example, when r = 100, w = 60, cv = 0 33, and q = 0 2, the optimal buyback price should be s * = 50 5. Suppose that we remove the buyback and price protection (i.e., use the wholesale price only). The numerical results show that information sharing decreases the manufacturer's profit by 3% in such an uncoordinated system. Thus to fully capitalize on shared information, the supply chain needs to be coordinated first. Figure 2 shows that ET is roughly a convex decreasing function of retail price, which means that the effect of information sharing is less obvious when ∆ET% the retail price is high. It should be noted that when the retail price increases, the supply chain profit increases, but ET decreases. Figure 3 shows that ET is roughly a concave increasing function of production cost c. Note that c is the overage cost gap between scenario j = 0 and j = 1 when b = 0. Because information sharing can effectively differentiate these two scenarios, instead of averaging them in the nonsharing case, we know intuitively that the bigger the overage cost gap is, the more savings information sharing can bring. Figure 3 also confirms the intuition that information sharing is more effective in a more volatile environment.
Impact of Demand Variability with
Age-Dependent Data In this section, we investigate the impact of demand variability on the value of sharing information as well as on the structure of the optimal polices with or without information sharing with channel coordination. The experiments are set up as follows. The distribution and failure rates of the cycle are given in Table 1 . The holding cost, production cost, and manufacturer's recovered value are age independent and are, respectively, h = 1, c = 30, and b = 0. The profit sharing ratio is = 0 57. The demand distribution is normal for all i with the same c.v. of 0 33. The mean of the demand is age-dependent and is shown in the last row of Table 1 . The impact of demand variability on savings of the coordinated system is summarized in Table 2 . Observe that when c.v. changes from 0.10 to 0.33, the absolute savings grows from 3.9 to 10.3, and the relative savings increases from 1.22% to 3.66%, even though the total profit is deceasing. This shows that information sharing is an effective management lever in dealing with volatile market conditions. Table 3 demonstrates that, not surprisingly, as the market becomes more volatile (keeping the means fixed), more safety stocks are required to buffer the uncertainty. Also observe that the stock-level gap, y * i0 − y * i1 , increases with respect to c.v. The managerial insight from this observation is that when the market demand is volatile, information sharing must be taken into account to develop different ordering polices for each scenario.
In our numerical setting, the age = 3 is the largest age with failure rate q 3 = 1; i.e., the state j = 0 i = 3 does not exist, and therefore the optimal policies of sharing and nonsharing cases coincide with each other for state j = 1 i = 3 . For i = 0 1 2, it is readily seen that the stock levels in the nonsharing case y * i and the sharing case y ij are decreasing sequences of the age i, with the relation y i0 ≤ y * i ≤ y i1 .
Coordinated vs. Uncoordinated
In this section, we compare the performance of the coordinated chain against the uncoordinated chain to quantify the profit increase due to channel coordination and shared information. Because there are so many contracts that do not coordinate the system, we decide to choose the wholesale price contract, which is widely used in practice but is not a coordinated contract (Katok and Wu 2006) . We use the same data in Table 1 except that we set the buyback and price protection rates to zero. We compute the optimal policies for both the coordinated and uncoordinated systems and report the results in Table 4 . The base-stock levels for the uncoordinated system are lower than those of the coordinated system. This is due to the absence of buyback and price protection, which makes the retailer reluctant to order enough inventory. Yet it should be noted that if we set the return price and price protection to be higher than those of the optimal contract, then the base-stock levels of the uncoordinated system are higher than those of the coordinated system. We also evaluate the time-average profit for the coordinated and uncoordinated systems and report the results in Table 5 . First we see that the chain profit of the uncoordinated system is lower than that of the coordinated system. Furthermore, in the uncoordinated system (e.g., when c.v. = 0 1 or 0.33), the retailer always benefits from information sharing, whereas the supplier may suffer. This finding underscores the importance of adopting appropriate coordination mechanisms such as the optimal contract developed in this paper. Without coordination mechanisms, the supplier may not be willing to share the upstream information. In a follow-up study, we plan to use laboratory experiments to verify the proposition that with a coordinated contract, the supplier is willing to share upstream information.
Another observation can be drawn from Table 5 : when the channel moves from uncoordinated to coordinated, the chain profit and retailer's profit increase while the supplier's profit decreases. But readers should be cautious when interpreting this observation. Note that with the wholesale price contract, the supplier does not shoulder any risk of overstocking. When the supplier offers to share the inventory risk, the wholesale price might increase. Depending on the bargaining power, a win-win may not always occur when the system moves from uncoordinated to coordinated with information sharing.
Discussion
To derive analytical results, we make several assumptions. This section discusses avenues of relaxing them. 1. Exogenous new-product strategy. Our model assumes that the new-product development is exogenous and the manufacturer launches the new product as soon as the development is complete. But it would be interesting to include more factors in the manufacturer's new-product decisions and to consider them jointly with information sharing.
2. Consistent belief. In the baseline model, we assume that the retailer infers the probability of newproduct introduction from the age of the cycle. If the retailer's belief is not correct, it is easy to imagine that the performance of the entire system will deteriorate. In other words, information sharing leads to a larger ET because the shared information corrects the retailer's belief.
3. Zero lead time. As discussed in Chen (2003) , it is well known that when we combine lost sales with a positive lead time, the distribution of the satisfied demand over the lead time is very difficult to characterize (even when the random demand is not age dependent). Here, we consider the random product life cycle and age-dependent cost parameters, which makes an exact analysis intractable if we include a positive lead time.
4. Manufacturer's operational model. One can consider a more complex operational model for the manufacturer. For example, the manufacturer could adjust the capacity prior to receiving the retail order and pay a cost for it. But most companies are using the "inchup" strategy (Souza et al. 2004 ) because of the timeto-market pressure, so today's new-product upgrade may not cause an upgrade of all the machinery or equipment. In other words, the cost of capacity adjustment might not be the dominant factor. Furthermore, in contrast to the capacity upgrade that occurs once in a cycle, wholesale revenue has a cumulative effect on the manufacturer's profit. Therefore, our model is useful for firms in which the wholesale revenue is a bigger concern than the capacity cost.
5. Demand independency on new-product information. Our model implicitly assumes that the information about new-product introduction is not shared with consumers. When the manufacturer shares such information with the retailer through public channels, consumers are also informed. As such, the consumer's random demand could depend on both i and j. To accommodate such nuances, one can write D ij instead of D i in our formulations. Note that the optimal supply chain contract proposed in §4.3 is not dependent on the distribution of demand. Our analytical results remain valid except for Proposition 3. When the demand dependency on j affects the long-run profits of retailer and manufacturer, we cannot guarantee that information sharing would increase supply chain profit. By assuming that customers are unable to observe the new-product information, we thereby make information sharing the sole economic force that affects supply chain performance.
Concluding Remarks
Frequent introduction of new products has created challenges in managing supply chains. This paper studies the effect of sharing upstream information in a periodic-review inventory system composed of a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer introduces new and improved products over time by using a solo-roll strategy. The cost parameters and demand distributions are age dependent. We devise an optimal supply chain contract that coordinates the supply chain regardless of whether the information is shared or not. We explicitly derive the parameters for this optimal contract. Under the optimal contract, we assess the effect of sharing the upstream information about new-product introduction in the supply chain. We show that information sharing always improves the profits of both supply chain partners if the supply chain is coordinated. But if the supply chain is not coordinated, this may not be true. Our research could be valuable for industries with declining prices and complements the literature on information sharing and product rollover.
